



Colonial and Post-Colonial Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth: 
Peace, Order and Good Government1  
The Commonwealth2 boasts the common law legal tradition, easily the most dominant 
of the leading international legal systems today; spreading from North America to 
Singapore and from India to South Africa.  The Peace, Order and Good Government 
(POGG) clause is a common feature of considerable vintage in Commonwealth 
constitutions. With its origins in the royal prerogative of the British monarch,3 the POGG 
clause has been a considerably versatile and ubiquitous clause in Commonwealth 
constitutionalism. It is, as Lord Hoffman stated, ‘the traditional formula by which 
legislative powers are conferred upon the legislature of a colony or a former colony 
upon the attainment of independence.’4 The origins of the POGG clause in an 
anachronistic feature of British constitutionalism marks it out as a constitutional 
element that ought to be critically interrogated in an age of human rights and 
democracy. Significantly, in R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Bancoult No. 2 (CA))5 Sedley LJ observed that 
peace, order and good government’ has a ‘long legislative pedigree’ and has 
become ‘a term of art in the sense that it is regularly used without further 
explanation to denote the delegation of large but undefined powers to a 
nominated rule-maker. Since at its fullest it can bring about the creation of 
independent states, it is a power of the greatest importance carrying 
commensurate responsibilities.’6  
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The POGG power has played an important role in colonial and post-colonial 
constitutionalism as it has had not only a legal but also, political and historical 
significance in various jurisdictions in the Commonwealth. It has for instance been 
regarded as a key expression of Canadian socio-political life. A former Canadian Prime 
Minister has advocated for it to be taken as the mainstay of Canadian foreign policy. In 
2001, peace, order and good government also featured prominently during the 
centenary celebration of the Australian federation where, among others, it formed the 
theme of the Senate exhibition to commemorate the inauguration of the First 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. A collection of speeches 
delivered at the launch of the exhibition was aptly titled For Peace, Order, and Good 
Government: the Centenary of the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia.7 In much 
unrelated circumstances, in Nigeria (and some other parts of the Commonwealth) 
‘peace, order and good government’ hallmarked military legislation which abrogated or 
curtailed fundamental constitutional rights, completely subordinated the Constitution 
to military fiat, or at the least, critically hollowed out its provisions in favour of 
authoritarian military ‘legislation’ for the better part of three decades in its post-
colonial period. In South Africa, it was a rather subtle but nonetheless effective part of 
the legal stratagem of apartheid regimes for legalising spatial segregation, internal 
displacement and deportation. 
 
Despite its ubiquitous nature and its continued deployment for a variety of purposes in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, the POGG clause remains a relatively under-theorised and 
under-researched theme. Existing analyses have tended to generally take for granted 
the appropriateness of the POGG clause itself while critiquing political application and 
3 
 
judicial interpretation of it. The nature of the power, its objects and limits has been 
subject of considerable judicial interpretation in Commonwealth jurisdictions. This 
justifies much more comprehensive, comparative, or at least, cross-jurisdictional 
analysis than currently exists in the literature on Commonwealth constitutionalism.  
The peace, order and good government clause has continued to wax strong in the 
constitutions and in some cases, legislation, of Commonwealth countries. Most federal 
and even some unitary states’ constitutions or constitutional arrangements contain a 
general power conferred on the legislature (or in some instances, the head of 
government, state or province as in India)8 to make laws for the ‘peace, order and good 
government’ of the whole country or a province, region or state within it. For instance, 
in countries like Canada, Australia and Nigeria, there is a well-established legislative 
practice of denoting the residual jurisdiction through the peace, order and good 
government in the usually contested division of subject heads of power between 
national and subnational units. As a result, the interpretation of the POGG clause has 
been central to moderating contending jurisdictional claims in such countries. This 
practice contributes considerably to its versatility in both constitutionally sophisticated, 
advanced democratic Commonwealth countries like Canada and Australia as well less 
sophisticated and even semi-authoritarian or at best, democratising states like Nigeria 
and Fiji.  
At the constitutional level, the POGG only applied to a part of the United Kingdom 
(Northern Ireland from 1921-1972) but it also featured in some legislation in England 
and Wales to where this book traces its origins. Importantly too, United Kingdom’s 
judicial institutions (especially the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but also - 
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before its demise - the House of Lords) have, not surprisingly, played a pivotal role in 
the interpretation and controversial application of the POGG clause.  
 
The foregoing justifies a cross-jurisdictional analysis. The analyses in this book focuses 
mainly on six key Commonwealth jurisdictions; Australia, Canada, India, Nigeria, South 
Africa and United Kingdom (but also the United States as part of the British North 
American colonies but not the Commonwealth). This book traces the history, judicial 
interpretation and political application of the clause as a constitutive and statutory 
provision. The inquiry shows that the POGG clause has relevance in a number of 
significant aspects of legal and socio-political ordering across the Commonwealth. This 
book explores how the POGG clause has been used not only as a moderating mechanism 
for resolving jurisdictional disputes in Commonwealth federations, attribution of 
emergency powers, review of administrative action, but also further the designs of 
colonialism, authoritarianism and apartheid.  
  
Critical analysis of the peace, order and good government clause presents a paradox. 
There is on the one hand, the deployment of the POGG clause to promote (presumably) 
liberal democratic values of (even if initially, limited) self-government, consociation of 
elite power and public welfare and on the other hand, its application to further 
opposing values of authoritarianism and apartheid. A major reason for that paradox, 
this study argues, is the imperial origins of the clause. Notwithstanding its imperial 
origins, the POGG clause has remained considerably resilient and remained, with few 
exceptions, in Commonwealth constitutions for over a century in some cases. One of the 
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last decisions of the British House of Lords; R (on the application of Bancoult) v Secretary 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Bancoult No. 2), highlights the 
significance of a surviving power crafted in a pre-democratic age. This book argues that 
the paradox of the POGG clause justifies a case for change regarding its application and 
judicial interpretation. 
 
It will be obvious to any reader of this book that despite the cross-jurisdictional focus, 
there are more references to Canadian materials; primary and secondary, in advancing 
the discussion in various parts of this book than any other Commonwealth jurisdiction. 
There are two reasons for this. The first is purely functional. It is the fact that there are 
easily more Canadian cases than in any jurisdiction and Canadian authors have been 
easily the most prolific on evaluating peace, order and good government as a concept. 
Thus, the jurisdiction has the most extensive literature on all the perspectives of 
interest in this book; legal history, constitutional law and politics. The second derives 
from the crucial position of the doctrine of precedent in the common law system. This is 
particularly significant when it converges with the de facto ‘supreme tribunal’ of the 
British Empire role of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). The influence 
and impact of the JCPC, as will be discussed almost throughout this book, is writ large in 
Commonwealth constitutionalism and this still remains the case for a number 
Commonwealth countries or territories. In any event, a major consequence of the 
convergence is that some early Canadian cases, as highlighted in various parts of this 
book, have remained the most influential in fixing the conventional, (some would claim, 





It is also relevant to say a few words about the presentational style of this book. The 
reader may find that there are quite a number of quotes in the book; this is deliberate. I 
consider it appropriate to provide direct quotes from a number of primary materials, a 
good number of which are referenced in this book for two key reasons. First is the fact 
that a reasonable part of the book is concerned with the history of ‘peace, order 
[welfare] and good government’ in the Commonwealth which to my mind requires 
taking the reader through the instruments which constitute the sources of its 
introduction across the British Empire and allowing them to ‘speak for themselves’.  
More importantly, the ‘orthodox’ legal position on the meaning of the POGG is assumed, 
indeed claimed, to flow from historiographical accounts of its introduction and 
application. That view is claim is directly challenged in this book. Among others, I 
present a counter argument to the originalist account of peace, order and good 
government as ‘a term of art’ that means a plenary grant of power in a style that allows 
the reader to form an opinion based on access to archival and historical sources; 
political, social and legal, relevant to the introduction and development of the clause.  
These are mainly imperial instruments that have been commonly alluded to in scholarly 
and judicial discussions of the clause but scarcely ever directly allowed to speak for 
themselves.  Indeed, the picture that emerges from a survey of scholarly and judicial 
discussion of the peace, order and good government clause has been mainly one that 
can be described as ‘legal recycling’. By this I mean constant reference to a closed circle 
of  cases which are hardly interrogated as to their actual facts and ratios for (re) stating 
what is considered to be the settled position on ‘peace, order [welfare] and good 
government’ in the Commonwealth. To set the tone for the need to cast a closer look at 
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the meaning of the clause, I have taken a fairly detailed look at the facts of the four most 
popular cases on the peace, order and good government clause; R v Burah and Anor,9 
Russell v The Queen,10 Hodge v Queen,11  and Louis Riel v The Queen ex parte Riel12 in the 
hope that any irritation that may be occasioned thereby is hopefully overshadowed by a 
fresh attempt to capture the essence of the cases in their context.  Finally, it is relevant to 
point out that I have tried as much as possible (I suspect without complete success 
though) to retain the style of reference to judicial officers in the respective jurisdictions 
as reflected in law reports and relevant academic literature.  
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